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Articulated Information and the Formation of Human Reality: A Linguistic-Theoretical Approach

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ABSTRACT

This article develops the concept of articulated information to explain how language participates in the formation of human reality. The central problem is that language is often treated either as a neutral instrument for representing an already completed world or as a purely social convention. This article argues for a different position. Information becomes reality-relevant when it is articulated into distinctions, classifications, narratives, speech acts, institutional procedures, and media forms. The article is presented as a theoretical essay and conceptual synthesis drawing on semiotics, philosophy of language, speech act theory, social ontology, discourse theory, narrative studies, media theory, and recent work on digital language systems. Its main contribution is the distinction between truth and reality-effect. Articulated information may become experientially, behaviorally, culturally, or institutionally real even when its truth-status is uncertain, partial, distorted, or false. The article also clarifies how articulated information differs from related concepts such as discourse, representation, classification, symbolic power, institutional facts, and social construction. A developed case example shows how diagnostic language can become consequential across personal, institutional, and social contexts. The article concludes that human reality is formed through the articulation, stabilization, mediation, interpretation, and practical consequences of information, without reducing material reality to language.

Keywords: Articulated Information; Discourse Analysis; Speech Acts; Social Ontology; Narrative Identity; Language Ideology; Media Materiality

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1. Introduction

Language is commonly treated as a medium of communication, a symbolic system, or a means of representing an already existing world. These perspectives are useful, but they often rest on an assumption that warrants closer examination: that reality is first presented as a completed external object and that language enters only afterward as a descriptive tool. Classical linguistics, semiotics, symbolic philosophy, and ordinary-language philosophy have already shown that language does not merely attach words to an independently finished reality, but organizes signs, distinctions, uses, and symbolic forms through which meaning becomes available^[1–5].

The external-object model has been highly productive for scientific practice. It allows phenomena to be described, measured, compared, and operationalized. Yet methodological usefulness should not be mistaken for a complete account of how reality becomes available to human beings in the first place. The point is not to deny external reality or other subjects. It is to avoid treating them as unmediated starting points. Human beings do not encounter reality only as detached observers of a completed object-world. What is immediately available is a lived field of impressions, sensations, emotions, memories, expectations, images, behavioral tendencies, and interpretations.

Even distinctions such as inner and outer, self and world, appearance and object, memory and event, possibility and fact are not given as fully stabilized structures in isolation. They become reliable through recurring experience, symbolic articulation, practical action, and communicative reinforcement. This does not make the world a private fantasy. It means that reality, as humanly available, is mediated through forms of experience and articulation.

In this article, human reality refers to the lived field in which bodily conditions, inner experience, symbolic distinctions, cultural assumptions, social recognition, values, and actions become organized into meaningful and consequential patterns. The term does not imply that all such formations are true, proven, or ontologically final. It describes the field in which information becomes experientially, behaviorally, culturally, and institutionally real. This definition preserves a crucial distinction between material reality, lived reality, and truth. Material reality is not denied; rather, the question is how it becomes available, intelligible, communicable, and consequential within human experience.

The term “lived field” is used in a phenomenological sense, though without making the article dependent on a full phenomenological method. It refers to reality as it is available within embodied experience before it is reduced to an abstract object of detached observation. In this respect, the argument is compatible with phenomenological accounts that emphasize perception, embodiment, and world-involvement rather than a purely external-observer model. Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodied perception is especially relevant here because it shows that the world is not first encountered as a neutral object standing before a detached mind, but as a field of involvement in which perception, movement, orientation, and meaning are already intertwined^[6].

The expression “lived field” is therefore used descriptively rather than as the result of a systematic phenomenological method. The article does not perform a phenomenological reduction or claim to reconstruct the full transcendental conditions of experience. The term identifies the embodied and experientially available domain within which information becomes meaningful, while the article’s method remains conceptual synthesis.

The central claim is that human reality emerges where information becomes articulated, stabilized, interpreted, mediated, and consequential. Language is one of the primary human processes through which this occurs. It does not merely represent an already completed world; it gives information the form through which distinctions, relations, identities, memories, expectations, obligations, values, institutions, and possible futures become reality-relevant.

A central distinction must therefore be maintained between truth and reality-effect. Human beings often live within structures that are not proven in any final sense, but are culturally assumed, linguistically repeated, emotionally reinforced, institutionally supported, and behaviorally enacted. Such structures may become real in their consequences without being true in a stronger epistemic sense. A social category, a moral code, a political identity, a medical label, or a narrative of the self may organize perception and action long before its truth has been established. This is not a weakness of the argument; it is the reason the reality-forming function of language requires critical analysis.

The argument is also relevant to linguistics and education. In discourse analysis, language ideology, narrative studies, and applied linguistics, language is not only a vehi-

cle of information but also a medium through which social categories, learner identities, institutional expectations, and public meanings are formed. Educational contexts are especially important because classrooms, curricula, assessment categories, feedback practices, and institutional labels do not merely describe learners; they can shape what learners and institutions come to recognize as ability, difficulty, progress, failure, or potential.

The guiding question is therefore not whether language creates the physical universe, but how information becomes a human world. The article addresses this question by examining how language gives information symbolic, experiential, material, and practical form.

2. Theoretical Method and Scope

This article is a theoretical essay and conceptual synthesis. It does not present empirical data, experimental findings, interviews, or corpus analysis. Its purpose is to develop and delimit a conceptual framework for examining how language participates in the formation of human reality. The synthesis is guided by a problem-oriented selection of literature: sources were selected because they address one of five necessary dimensions of the argument, namely signification, articulation, social recognition, institutional consequence, and media-mediated durability. Semiotics and philosophy of language clarify how signs and uses become meaningful; speech act theory and social ontology clarify how utterances and procedures become consequential; narrative studies clarify how temporal meaning and identity are organized; media theory clarifies how oral, print, and digital forms alter durability and circulation; and research on misinformation and digital language systems clarifies how articulated information may be amplified, distorted, or recursively stabilized.

The method proceeds in four steps. First, the article treats the external-object assumption as a methodological posture rather than as a complete account of human reality. This does not deny material reality; it limits a methodological assumption that is often treated as philosophically complete. Second, the article defines information conceptually as structured difference capable of being selected, related, transmitted, stabilized, and made consequential. Third, it examines language as a process of articulation: a process through which information becomes distinguishable, interpretable, commu-

nicable, and actionable. Fourth, it evaluates the consequences of this process in naming, syntax, reference fields, narrative, speech acts, scientific concepts, institutional procedures, media forms, articulatory power, and distorted reality formation.

This approach is not a purely social-constructionist account. It does not begin with society alone. It begins with the transformation of information into experience, meaning, stabilization, and consequence. Social recognition is one part of this process, but not its whole basis. Inner experience, memory, emotion, imagination, bodily states, attention, and behavioral tendencies also belong to the field in which information becomes reality-relevant.

The approach also differs from strong linguistic determinism. It does not argue that language mechanically determines thought or fixes reality. Rather, language provides stabilizing forms through which information becomes available as objects, relations, values, narratives, identities, obligations, and possible actions. In this sense, language is neither a mere mirror of reality nor an omnipotent creator of reality. It is a primary articulatory process through which information becomes humanly meaningful and consequential.

3. Conceptual Framework: Articulated Information and Human Reality

This section develops the conceptual framework of the article. It does not present empirical results, but clarifies how articulated information moves from distinction to practical consequence. The following subsections develop the main stages of the framework. First, they show that objecthood, as available within human inquiry, depends on distinction and stabilization. Second, they argue that information becomes meaningful only when articulated into recognizable forms. Third, they examine how language, naming, syntax, reference fields, narrative, speech acts, scientific concepts, institutional procedures, material media, articulatory power, and distorted reality formation demonstrate the broader claim that human reality is formed through articulated information.

3.1. The External-Object Assumption

Modern scientific inquiry often depends on the assumption that the world can be treated as an external object ob-

served by a subject who stands apart from it. This assumption is not rejected here; it is treated as methodologically powerful but conceptually incomplete. It enables measurement, repeatability, controlled observation, formal description, and public verification. Without such methodological distancing, many forms of empirical science would be impossible.

However, methodological usefulness should not be confused with epistemic completeness. The world is not initially available to human beings only as a scientifically defined object. It appears as lived experience. Objecthood, as a stable form within human experience and inquiry, depends on acts of distinction, stabilization, and articulation. Before something can become an object of measurement or evidence, it must be distinguished, identified, and stabilized within a conceptual and methodological field.

This matters because language is often placed too late in the process. If reality is assumed to be fully formed before language enters, language can only be a representational tool. It can name, describe, report, or communicate what is already there. But if objecthood, classification, measurement, identity, value, and relevance are themselves stabilized forms of articulated information, then language participates much earlier. It helps organize the field in which something can appear as an object, a relation, a cause, a fact, a memory, a threat, a promise, or a possibility.

The external-object assumption therefore needs to be limited rather than rejected. It remains valid as a methodological simplification, but incomplete as an account of human reality. Human reality cannot be reduced to the passive reception of an external object-world; it is a lived field in which information is organized into meaningful and consequential form.

3.2. Information, Meaning, and Articulation

Information is used here in a conceptual rather than mathematical sense: as structured difference capable of being selected, related, transmitted, stabilized, and made consequential. This usage is informed by, but not reducible to, technical communication theory and philosophical accounts of information^[7,8]. Information is not identical with meaning. Nor is it already a world. It may be present as pattern, contrast, intensity, relation, possibility, or signal without yet being articulated into a stable human form.

A bodily sensation may be present before it is named.

A recurring emotional pattern may shape behavior before it is recognized. A social condition may govern life before it is conceptually identified. A scientific anomaly may appear in data before it becomes a defined object of inquiry. In each case, something is given as information, but not yet fully formed as meaning.

Meaning begins when information becomes articulated. It is distinguished from background, related to other distinctions, stabilized through memory or repetition, and placed within an interpretive field. Human reality begins to form where such meaning becomes consequential: where it affects perception, behavior, expectation, identity, recognition, or institutional practice.

The concept of articulated information is introduced to name this transition. It refers to information that has been given form within experience and symbolic practice. The movement from information to human reality is therefore not automatic; it depends on forms that render information recognizable and consequential.

To avoid ambiguity, articulation is used here in a broader sense than phonetic speech production or the verbal expression of already formed thoughts. It refers to the process by which information is formed into recognizable, communicable, and consequential structures. Linguistic articulation includes naming, classifying, narrating, and declaring, but it also includes the stabilization of distinctions that make such acts possible. This usage should be distinguished from cognitive or neural mapping. Neural and cognitive processes may support articulation by enabling perception, memory, prediction, affective salience, and motor expression; however, articulation, as used here, denotes the formation of information into meaningful structures rather than the biological mechanisms underlying that formation.

Articulation is also not exclusively intersubjective. Intersubjective recognition is necessary when articulated information becomes socially or institutionally stable, but articulation may begin within individual experience. Inner speech, self-description, mental labeling, remembered phrases, imagined dialogues, and recurring self-narratives can already function as articulated information when they stabilize experience into recognizable patterns. Such inner articulation may remain private while still shaping perception, emotion, expectation, and behavior; it becomes more durable and publicly consequential when it enters shared or institutional reference fields.

3.3. What Does Not Count as Articulated Information

Because the concept of articulated information is intentionally broad, its limits must be stated clearly. Not every signal, sensation, pattern, or difference already counts as articulated information. A bodily sensation before recognition, a technical signal before interpretation, a statistical correlation before conceptual framing, or an isolated sound before meaningful use may contain information, but it is not yet articulated information in the sense used here.

Articulated information begins only when information is formed into a recognizable structure that can organize experience, interpretation, communication, memory, action, or institutional procedure. This means that articulation requires more than mere occurrence. It requires distinction, form, relation, and potential consequence. A pain signal becomes articulated information when it is named as a symptom, interpreted within a medical category, narrated by a patient, recorded in a file, or connected to treatment. A social difference becomes articulated information when it is classified, named, repeated, institutionalized, or acted upon. A digital pattern becomes articulated information when it is rendered as a searchable category, ranked result, recommendation, label, or generated response.

The concept therefore does not claim that all reality is linguistic. It also does not claim that all information is al-

ready meaningful. Its specific function is to identify the transition through which structured difference becomes meaningful and consequential within human reality. This transition may occur through language, but also through documents, diagrams, instruments, classifications, records, procedures, interfaces, and algorithmic systems. Language remains central because it gives information an explicit, repeatable, contestable, and transmissible form.

3.4. Difference from Related Concepts

Articulated information overlaps with several established theoretical vocabularies, but it is not identical with them (**Table 1**). It differs from representation because it does not primarily ask whether language mirrors an external object correctly. It asks how information becomes formed into a reality-relevant distinction, relation, category, narrative, or action possibility. It differs from discourse because discourse usually refers to historically and socially organized systems of statement, knowledge, and power, while articulated information also includes pre-public, inner, technical, and procedural forms of stabilization. It differs from classification because classification is only one form of articulation, whereas articulated information also includes syntax, narrative, speech acts, reference fields, instruments, media forms, and digital operations.

Table 1. Delimiting articulated information from adjacent theoretical concepts.

Concept	Primary Focus	Difference from Articulated Information	Example
Representation	Reference or depiction	May describe a formed object; articulated information also helps form the object, status, or relation as meaningful.	A word labels an object; a legal phrase creates a status.
Discourse	Socially patterned language and knowledge	Discourse is a stabilized field; articulated information names the process by which distinctions become stable enough to enter such a field.	A policy discourse depends on repeated categories.
Classification	Ordered categories	Classification is one mode of articulation, not the whole process.	A diagnostic category orders symptoms and actions.
Symbolic power	Authority over legitimate meaning	Power shapes which articulations dominate; articulation can also occur privately or technically before public authority is involved.	A school label becomes authoritative when institutionally repeated.
Institutional fact	Recognized social status	An institutional fact is a stabilized outcome of articulation under valid rules.	A certificate, verdict, grade, or contract.
Social construction	Social production of reality	Articulated information does not claim that reality is merely socially produced; it examines how information becomes meaningful and consequential while preserving the distinction between material constraint, lived reality, and truth.	A social category may become consequential without exhausting material reality.

The concept also differs from symbolic power. Symbolic power explains how authorized language can impose or legitimize social reality. Articulated information includes

this problem, but it is not limited to domination or authority. It also includes ordinary naming, self-description, scientific modeling, educational framing, and narrative organization.

It differs from institutional facts because institutional facts depend on collective recognition and accepted procedures, whereas articulated information may begin before institutional recognition, for example, in inner speech, informal categories, diagnostic suspicion, or emerging public narratives. Finally, it differs from social construction because it does not claim that reality is merely socially produced. It focuses on the process through which information becomes meaningful and consequential while preserving the distinction between material constraint, lived reality, and truth.

The added value of the concept is therefore integrative and process-oriented. It names the movement from information to human reality across personal, linguistic, social, institutional, scientific, and media environments. Existing theories often analyze one layer of this process. The concept of articulated information is proposed to describe the process that connects these layers.

3.5. Language as Articulation, Not Mere Representation

The representational view of language treats words as labels attached to things that are already fully formed. On this view, reality comes first, language comes second, and speech merely points to what exists independently of it. This limitation of a purely representational view is consistent with ordinary-language philosophy, discourse theory, and recent approaches to language as socially and cognitively consequential practice^[5,9–11]. This view explains some functions of language, but it fails to capture the deeper role of language in forming human reality.

Language does not simply report meaning after it has already been formed. It participates in the formation of meaning itself. Through language, impressions can become memories, feelings can become claims, perceptions can become objects, patterns can become concepts, and intentions can become obligations. Language thereby stabilizes information across time and makes it available for interpretation, repetition, correction, and consequence.

This does not mean that language determines thought in a strict sense. Nor does it mean that language mechanically fixes reality. The argument is more precise: language provides stabilizing forms through which information becomes available as objects, relations, values, narratives, identities, and possible actions. It enables information to be carried

across time, repeated across contexts, and recognized within communicative practice.

Language therefore provides the forms through which information can be remembered, shared, contested, institutionalized, and enacted.

3.6. Naming, Classification, and Informational Boundaries

Naming is one of the most basic operations of articulated information. To name is to draw an informational boundary. A name separates something from the flow of experience and makes it available for recognition, memory, communication, and dispute. What is named can be referred to again. It can be taught, classified, measured, protected, forbidden, diagnosed, inherited, praised, condemned, or revised.

Human experience is not naturally divided into all the units that later appear obvious. Language marks boundaries. It determines what can be treated as a thing, an event, a condition, a person, a group, a right, a failure, a threat, or a possibility. Naming, therefore, does not merely attach a label to a pre-given object. It participates in the stabilization of what may count as an object within human experience and practice.

Classification extends naming into ordered systems. A classification does not merely list names; it arranges them into hierarchies, oppositions, continuities, exclusions, and rules of relevance. Classification systems are therefore not neutral containers of reality; they can produce durable consequences by shaping what becomes visible, comparable, reportable, and actionable^[12,13].

Naming and classification therefore show the double nature of articulated information. They make experience stable enough to become real in human life, but they also introduce the possibility of distortion. A name may clarify or reduce. A classification may disclose or impose. A category may become culturally powerful without being true in a final sense.

3.7. Syntax as Relational Order

Words do not form human reality in isolation. Isolated names create distinctions, but syntax creates relations. Syntax is not merely a grammatical mechanism for arranging

words. At a deeper level, syntax is the linguistic form of relational order. It determines agency, causality, temporality, possession, obligation, possibility, and consequence.

The world is not made of separate objects alone. It is made of relations. Someone acts. Something is affected. A cause precedes an effect. A promise binds a future. A law creates a prohibition. A diagnosis connects symptoms to a condition. A theory relates observations to a model. These relations are not given by isolated words. They require structured articulation.

Consider the difference between three statements: “The citizen owns the land,” “the state owns the land,” and “the land belongs to the ancestors.” The vocabulary overlaps, but the realities articulated by these sentences are not the same. Each statement orders agency, authority, memory, obligation, and legitimacy differently. This illustrates the broader insight of cognitive linguistics that linguistic structure does not merely package thought, but helps organize conceptual relations, metaphors, and frames through which experience becomes meaningful^[14].

Syntax, therefore, does not merely arrange expression. It organizes relations through which reality becomes intelligible. Through syntax, articulated information becomes a configuration of action, responsibility, time, causality, permission, prohibition, and possibility.

3.8. Reference Fields and Meaning Stability

No word stabilizes meaning by itself. Words function within reference fields. A reference field is the broader experiential, symbolic, cultural, institutional, practical, or scientific order within which a term becomes recognizable and consequential. Meaning is stable when a term can be used repeatedly across contexts without losing its recognizable function.

“Money” is meaningful only within an economic and institutional reference field. “Evidence” is meaningful only within legal, scientific, or argumentative practices. “Disease” is meaningful only within medical classification, bodily interpretation, and therapeutic procedure. “Law” is meaningful only within recognized authority, enforcement, and normative order. These examples are consistent with ordinary-language philosophy and social-ontological accounts of institutional facts and symbolic recognition^[5,15].

This does not mean that meaning is fixed forever. It

means that meaning requires enough stability to function. Without stability, communication dissolves into ambiguity. With excessive rigidity, meaning becomes dogmatic and resistant to correction. Human reality depends on a dynamic balance between stabilization and revision.

This point prevents the theory from becoming a naive claim that words automatically create reality. Words become reality-forming only when they operate within fields of recognition, repetition, interpretation, and consequence. A purely private sign may express an inner experience, but it cannot stabilize communicable meaning unless it enters a broader field of use, recognition, or interpretation. For articulated information to become human reality, it must become recognizable and consequential within a broader field of experience and practice.

3.9. Narrative, Memory, and Non-Final Meaning

Human reality is not only formed through names, classifications, and reference fields. It is also formed through narrative. Narrative organizes time. It connects past impressions, present interpretation, and future possibility into a meaningful sequence. Narrative theory and narrative identity research have shown that human beings organize experience through stories that reconstruct the past, stabilize the present, and anticipate possible futures^[16–18].

Narrative also shows that meaning is not final. An event may acquire new meaning later. What once seemed accidental may later be interpreted as decisive. What once seemed like failure may become the beginning of a new direction. What once seemed like success may later be reinterpreted as error. Human meaning is therefore not produced only by what came before. It is also shaped by what later becomes recognized, fulfilled, denied, or enacted.

A life event demonstrates this structure clearly. An experience that was once interpreted as failure may later become part of a narrative of transformation, while a former success may later be reinterpreted as misdirection. The meaning of an event is not fixed by its occurrence alone; it is shaped by later articulation and consequence.

The same applies to identity. A person does not merely possess an identity as a fixed object. Identity is narratively stabilized. People understand themselves through stories of origin, conflict, decision, loss, purpose, fear, hope, and

possibility. These narratives may liberate, but they may also confine. A person may live inside a story that is consequential without being true. Language forms inner reality not only by describing experience, but by organizing memory, expectation, emotion, and behavioral patterns.

3.10. Speech Acts and Consequential Reality

Speech act theory provides one of the strongest demonstrations that language is not merely representational. Certain utterances do not simply describe a state of affairs; they bring about a change within a recognized field of practice^[19,20]. A promise creates an obligation. A verdict creates a legal status. A declaration of marriage creates an institutional bond. A contract creates rights and duties. A dismissal terminates employment. A diagnosis changes the status of a bodily condition within medical and social systems.

The reality-forming power of speech acts depends on conditions. A verdict only works when issued by a recognized authority in a valid procedure. A contract only works when accepted within a legal order. A diagnosis only works within a medical field that recognizes its categories and procedures. Speech acts therefore confirm the central thesis: language becomes reality-forming when articulated information acquires consequence.

Speech acts also show that human reality is not merely mental. A declaration can change access to property, legal responsibility, institutional recognition, bodily treatment, financial obligation, and social identity. These changes are not imaginary. They are real consequences within human reality, even though they depend on language, recognition, and procedure.

Language forms reality when it changes what can be done, expected, recognized, demanded, enforced, remembered, or contested. Words become reality-forming not because they are sounds, but because they articulate information into consequential form.

3.11. Scientific and Institutional Reality as Articulated Information

Scientific reality is often presented as the opposite of linguistic construction. This contrast is misleading. Science does not escape articulation; it disciplines articulation. Scientific language does not create empirical reality arbitrarily.

It makes empirical reality observable, comparable, testable, and communicable through concepts, measurements, classifications, methods, instruments, and procedures.

Data do not become scientific evidence by existing alone. They become evidence when articulated through a method, interpreted through a concept, and stabilized within a recognized field of inquiry. This does not make science arbitrary. It makes science methodologically articulated. Scientific objectivity depends on disciplined forms of articulation: definitions, instruments, measurements, protocols, peer review, reproducibility, statistical standards, and conceptual clarity. This claim is consistent with work on social construction, classification systems, discourse formation, and institutional facts, while preserving the distinction between empirical constraint and arbitrary construction^[12,13,15,21,22].

Measurement instruments are especially important because they can be understood as non-human articulators in a limited and technical sense: they translate selected empirical differences into readable, comparable, and recordable forms. A thermometer, microscope, spectrometer, imaging device, sensor, or algorithmic classifier does not simply mirror reality in a neutral way. It is designed to register specific differences and to exclude others. Such instruments do not create empirical reality arbitrarily, but they participate in determining which aspects of reality become detectable, measurable, and communicable within a scientific field. Scientific articulation is therefore not only linguistic in the narrow sense; it is also technical and material. Instruments, protocols, diagrams, databases, and visualizations help transform empirical differences into stabilized informational objects.

This point is compatible with actor-network approaches to science, which emphasize that scientific facts are stabilized through networks of human actors, instruments, inscriptions, laboratories, procedures, and institutional practices^[23]. The present argument does not reduce scientific truth to social construction. Rather, it emphasizes that empirical constraint becomes scientifically effective only when articulated through material, technical, linguistic, and institutional forms.

The same applies to institutions. Legal systems, universities, financial markets, medical systems, states, and scientific communities all depend on language, documentation, classification, recognition, instruments, records, and procedure. Their realities are no less real because they are

symbolically and materially mediated. They are powerful because articulation becomes organized into durable consequences.

Institutional contexts demonstrate how language makes information explicit, repeatable, transmissible, and enforceable without operating independently of material conditions, instruments, recognition, and procedure.

3.12. Case Example: Diagnostic Language as Articulated Information

A diagnostic label provides a clear example of articulated information. Before diagnosis, a person may experience sensations, difficulties, behavioral patterns, or emotional states. These experiences may be real, but they are not yet stabilized within a recognized interpretive field. Once a diagnostic term is introduced, the same field of experience is reorganized. The label distinguishes certain features from background experience, connects them to a classification system, places them within a medical or psychological reference field, and makes them communicable to professionals, institutions, family members, and the person concerned.

The diagnosis may then become consequential in several ways. It can guide treatment, justify accommodation, shape self-understanding, affect insurance, influence educational or workplace decisions, and alter how others interpret the person's behavior. The diagnosis is therefore not merely a description added to an unchanged reality. It becomes part of the reality through which the condition is experienced, managed, recognized, and institutionally processed.

At the same time, this case also shows why truth and reality-effect must be distinguished. A well-supported diagnosis may be truth-oriented and therapeutically useful. A premature, inaccurate, stigmatizing, or institutionally convenient diagnosis may also generate powerful reality effects, but these effects do not prove its truth. The label may become real in consequences while remaining questionable in justification. Diagnostic language therefore shows the full structure of articulated information: information becomes distinguished, named, classified, stabilized, mediated, institutionally recognized, and enacted.

This diagnostic example is closely related to Hacking's account of looping effects, according to which classifications of human kinds may alter the self-understanding, behavior, treatment, and institutional position of the people classified.

Such feedback represents one important form of articulated information becoming consequential. The two concepts are not identical, however. Looping effects describe a reciprocal interaction between classifications and classified persons, whereas articulated information also includes forms of stabilization that do not necessarily generate such feedback, including inner articulation, technical representation, institutional documentation, material instruments, and algorithmic operations^[22,24].

3.13. Material Media and the Durability of Articulation

Articulation is never purely abstract. It is also mediated by material and technical forms. Oral, print, and digital media do not merely transmit identical content through neutral channels; they affect the speed, durability, reach, revisability, and authority of articulated information. The same statement can therefore have different reality-effects depending on the medium through which it is articulated.

Oral articulation is immediate, embodied, affectively charged, and responsive to context. It can transmit tone, gesture, rhythm, emphasis, and social presence in ways that strongly shape interpretation. Its limitation is durability: unless ritualized, memorized, recorded, or repeatedly performed, oral articulation is often unstable over time. Yet precisely because it is embodied and situated, oral language can generate powerful immediate consequences in command, persuasion, teaching, ritual, conflict, reconciliation, and collective emotion.

Print changes the temporal structure of articulation. It stabilizes linguistic forms by making them durable, portable, citable, and institutionally preservable. A printed legal text, scientific article, religious canon, constitution, contract, or textbook can outlast the moment of speech and organize action across time and distance. Print may slow certain forms of communication, but it strengthens continuity, authority, archival persistence, and standardization. It allows articulated information to become less dependent on immediate presence and more dependent on preservation, citation, replication, and institutional validation. This transformation is consistent with media-theoretical accounts of the relation between orality, literacy, and the technologizing of the word^[25].

Digital media alter the process again. They accelerate circulation, enable rapid replication and recombination, and

allow articulated information to become operational through search, ranking, automation, recommendation systems, generative models, and algorithmic amplification. In digital environments, language can move from communication to execution. A written query can retrieve information; a prompt can generate text or images; a command can trigger automated processes; a classification can shape visibility, access, and decision-making. Digital articulation therefore increases both the speed and the instability of reality formation. It can make meaning more widely available, but it can also amplify distortion before interpretation, verification, or correction has occurred.

This means that articulated information becomes reality-forming through both symbolic structure and medium-specific conditions. The durability of a legal text, the authority of a printed scientific article, the emotional force of oral address, and the viral speed of digital language all show that articulation has material conditions. Language forms reality not only because it creates distinctions and relations, but also because different media determine how long those distinctions endure, how fast they circulate, how far they travel, how easily they can be revised, and how strongly they become embedded in action.

3.14. Distortion, Projection, and Articulatory Power

The reality-forming power of language is not identical with truth. This distinction is essential. Language can disclose informational order, but it can also stabilize distortion. A false category can organize perception. A misleading narrative can structure identity. A propaganda term can generate collective emotion. A flawed diagnosis can reshape a life. An institutional label can produce lasting consequences even when it is inaccurate.

The distinction between truth and reality-effect therefore requires analytical criteria. A truth-oriented articulation remains open to correction, evidence, counter-example, contextual limitation, and procedural review. It does not become legitimate merely because it is repeated or institutionally enforced. By contrast, a distorted or manipulative articulation tends to close revision, suppress counter-evidence, intensify emotional fixation, convert uncertainty into certainty, and produce consequences disproportionate to its evidential basis.

Legitimate stabilization can therefore be distinguished

from distortion by asking five questions. First, is the articulation open to correction? Second, is it supported by appropriate evidence or experience? Third, are its limits clearly stated? Fourth, does it allow alternative descriptions to be examined? Fifth, are its practical consequences proportionate to its epistemic strength? These criteria do not guarantee truth, but they help distinguish truth-oriented articulation from mere reality-effect.

This distinction is especially important because a reality effect may be powerful without being justified. A label, diagnosis, political category, educational judgment, or public narrative can organize behavior and institutional response even when the articulation is weak, premature, or false. The critical task is therefore not only to ask whether language forms reality, but whether the reality formed by language remains accountable to truth-oriented procedures.

This does not weaken the thesis. It strengthens it. If language had no reality-forming power, linguistic distortion would be harmless. But false articulations can become experientially, behaviorally, culturally, and institutionally real when repeated, recognized, emotionally reinforced, and acted upon. They may produce real fear, exclusion, policy, conflict, and suffering.

A further issue is the unequal distribution of articulatory power. Not all persons, groups, institutions, or systems have the same capacity to define which distinctions become publicly recognized, which categories become authoritative, and which narratives become durable. Courts, schools, scientific institutions, medical authorities, media organizations, religious bodies, governments, and digital platforms do not merely circulate language; they can authorize, amplify, suppress, normalize, or delegitimize specific articulations. In this sense, reality formation is also shaped by asymmetries of articulation. The power to name, classify, diagnose, rank, recommend, or exclude is also the power to influence what becomes visible, credible, actionable, or socially real. This point is consistent with accounts of symbolic power and the social authority of language^[26].

In algorithmic environments, articulatory power is partly redistributed to technical systems. Search engines, recommendation systems, content moderation tools, ranking mechanisms, and generative models can amplify some articulations while rendering others marginal or invisible. This does not mean that algorithms possess independent

intentionality in the human sense. It means that once linguistic and symbolic distinctions are embedded in technical infrastructures, they can acquire operational force beyond the immediate intention of any single speaker. Algorithmic articulation therefore intensifies the central problem of this article: information may become consequential not only because it is true, but because it is repeatedly selected, ranked, circulated, and acted upon.

Contemporary misinformation research supports this distinction, showing that false or misleading information can generate durable social and affective consequences even when its factual basis is weak or contested^[27,28]. A related process occurs when inner formations are articulated as external realities. Fear may be interpreted as threat, desire as destiny, or a repeated self-narrative as identity. In each case, information is not necessarily true, but it becomes reality-relevant because it is interpreted, stabilized, and enacted.

A theory of articulated information must therefore include critique. The task is not only to show how language forms reality, but also to ask what kind of reality it forms, who has the authority to articulate it, and through which media and institutions it becomes durable. Does language clarify or obscure? Does it reveal structure or impose distortion? Does it open possibility or close it prematurely? Does it stabilize truth-oriented meaning or produce false worlds?

4. Discussion

The proposed concept of articulated information clarifies why language cannot be reduced either to representation or to social convention alone. Language represents, but it also articulates. It communicates, but it also stabilizes. It describes, but it can also generate consequences. The central contribution of this article is therefore not the familiar claim that language influences thought, nor the familiar claim that social reality is constructed. Its contribution is the claim that information becomes human reality when articulated forms acquire stability, interpretation, circulation, and practical force.

This account helps avoid two extremes. The first is an overly simple representational realism, according to which human beings passively receive a completed world and then describe it. The second is crude idealism, according to which language replaces or produces material reality. The position

developed here rejects both. Human reality is not matter alone, but neither is it an arbitrary invention. It is the lived field in which material impressions, inner states, symbolic forms, institutional recognitions, cultural assumptions, media forms, technical systems, and practical consequences become organized.

A strong realist or referentialist may object that objects, causal structures, and material conditions exist independently of whether they are linguistically articulated, and that successful reference is possible because language is constrained by this mind-independent reality. The present framework accepts the first part of this objection. It does not claim that articulation creates material entities or determines their properties. Its claim concerns the conditions under which material differences become distinguishable, intelligible, communicable, and consequential within human experience and practice. Material constraint and articulated availability therefore operate at different analytical levels: the former limits what can be truthfully asserted, while the latter concerns how those constraints become accessible and actionable within a human world^[29].

The theory also explains why false or partial meanings can nevertheless become real in their consequences. A narrative may be false and still shape identity. A category may be inaccurate and still organize policy. A diagnosis may be flawed and still alter behavior, treatment, and self-perception. This distinction between truth and reality-effect is essential for any adequate theory of language and reality.

The digital case becomes especially important when articulated information is not only circulated but also used as input for further automated generation. Recent work on large language models (LLMs) and discourse-level language processing shows that computational language systems can model and reproduce complex linguistic patterns, while also raising questions about meaning, public language, prediction, and factual reliability^[30–32]. This does not require treating digital systems as conscious agents. It requires recognizing that language, once embedded in technical systems, can become operationally consequential in new ways.

A further issue is recursive reality formation in digital environments. The technical literature on model collapse concerns a specific problem: generative models trained recursively on model-generated data may lose information about the original data distribution, especially less frequent

patterns^[33]. This technical finding should not be transferred directly into cultural theory as if societies functioned like machine-learning systems. The analogy is limited. Human communities include interpretation, resistance, memory, institutions, embodied experience, and deliberate correction.

Nevertheless, the technical problem is useful as a cautionary model. It shows that recursive informational environments can strengthen already dominant patterns while weakening exposure to marginal or less frequent variation. In cultural and linguistic environments, a comparable risk may arise when search systems, recommendation systems, generated texts, and repeated digital categories amplify what is already frequent, visible, or institutionally favored. The claim is therefore not that model collapse and cultural repetition are identical. The claim is that both show how recursive informational systems can reduce diversity and stabilize partial reality-effects when correction mechanisms are weak.

The result may therefore be more than misinformation in the ordinary sense: it may become a recursive stabilization of certain reality-effects. What is frequently generated, ranked, repeated, and reused may become more visible and more authoritative, even when it is only partially grounded in lived or empirical variation. This recursive process intensifies the central problem of the article: articulated information can become real in its consequences not only through human belief or institutional authority, but also through technical feedback loops that amplify some distinctions while weakening others.

For linguistic research, the framework suggests that analysis should not examine linguistic forms only as representations of prior social realities. It should also examine how articulated information creates reality effects through repetition, recognition, authority, institutional uptake, and media circulation. In educational research, this is especially relevant for labels such as gifted, struggling, advanced, remedial, at risk, learning disability, or special needs. Such terms may guide support, but they may also stabilize expectations and identities beyond their evidential basis, as recent studies on diagnostic and learning-disorder labels indicate^[34,35]. A theory of articulated information can therefore help distinguish useful educational articulation from premature or limiting categorization.

Future research can develop the concept of articulated information in several directions. Empirical studies could

examine how specific categories become stabilized in public discourse, how narratives alter behavioral patterns, or how institutional language creates durable reality-effects. Comparative linguistic research could examine how different symbolic systems draw different informational boundaries. Media research could investigate how oral, print, and digital forms alter the durability and speed of articulation. Digital discourse research could investigate how algorithmic repetition accelerates stabilization or distortion. Research on scientific practice could further examine how instruments, inscriptions, and databases function as material articulators of empirical difference. The present article offers the conceptual basis for such work.

5. Limitations

The scope of this article is deliberately theoretical. It does not attempt to provide a quantitative test, a corpus-based analysis, or an empirical validation of one isolated linguistic phenomenon. This is not a deficiency of the argument, but a consequence of its purpose. The article develops a conceptual framework for examining a process that operates across several domains: language, experience, classification, narrative, institutional recognition, media circulation, and digital mediation. A framework of this kind cannot be reduced to a single empirical case without losing the broader theoretical relation it seeks to clarify.

The first boundary of the argument concerns the relation between material reality and human reality. The article does not claim that language creates the physical world, nor does it reduce empirical reality to linguistic construction. Its claim is more precise: material conditions become humanly meaningful, communicable, actionable, and institutionally consequential through articulation. This distinction is essential. The article therefore does not weaken realism, but challenges a simplified form of realism in which reality is treated as if it were fully available before distinction, naming, classification, interpretation, and mediation.

The second boundary concerns the breadth of the concept of articulated information. The concept is intentionally integrative because the formation of human reality does not occur in language alone, nor in institutions alone, nor in individual experience alone. It occurs through the interaction of distinctions, symbolic forms, bodily experience, social

recognition, procedures, media, and consequences. The risk of such breadth is that the concept could be applied too loosely. For this reason, the article has defined articulated information by clear criteria: it must involve the formation of information into a recognizable structure capable of organizing experience, communication, memory, action, or institutional procedure. Mere signal, sensation, pattern, or data does not yet count as articulated information.

The third boundary concerns truth. The article does not argue that every reality-effect is legitimate simply because it becomes consequential. On the contrary, one of the central aims of the framework is to make this confusion visible. A false diagnosis, a manipulative political category, a misleading educational label, or a distorted public narrative may become real in its consequences without becoming true. The distinction between truth and reality-effect is therefore not a relativistic claim. It is a critical tool for examining how language can organize reality before, beyond, or even against adequate justification.

The fourth boundary concerns digital systems. The discussion of algorithmic mediation and recursive informational environments does not claim that human cultures function in the same way as machine-learning models. The analogy is limited and must remain limited. Human reality includes embodied experience, interpretation, resistance, memory, institutional correction, and deliberate revision. Nevertheless, digital systems intensify the problem examined in this article because they can rank, repeat, amplify, suppress, recombine, and operationalize articulated information at scale. The theoretical point is therefore not that technical models collapse directly explains culture, but that recursive informational environments can stabilize partial reality-effects when correction mechanisms are weak.

These boundaries do not reduce the significance of the argument. They define its proper level of analysis. The article does not offer a final theory of reality, language, or truth. It offers a framework for examining how information becomes meaningful and consequential across experiential, linguistic, institutional, and technical domains. Future research can apply this framework to discourse analysis, educational labeling, institutional language, diagnostic categories, media narratives, and digital systems, but the framework itself is necessary before such applications can be analytically precise.

6. Conclusions

This article has argued that human reality is formed through articulated information. It challenged the assumption that reality should be approached only as a completed external object described by a detached observer. Such an assumption remains useful in many scientific contexts, but it does not explain how reality becomes available as experience, object, relation, meaning, value, or consequence.

The main contribution of the article is the concept of articulated information: the process through which information becomes meaningful, stable, communicable, mediated, and consequential within human experience. Language is central to this process because it creates durable distinctions, orders relations, stabilizes meanings, organizes narratives, enables speech acts, and supports scientific and institutional procedures. Media also matter, because oral, print, and digital forms alter the speed, durability, reach, and revisability of articulation.

This does not mean that language replaces matter. It means that the world human beings inhabit is never matter alone. It is also formed through inner experience, symbolic distinctions, cultural assumptions, institutional recognition, media forms, technical systems, and practical consequences. Some of these formations are truth-oriented; others may be partial, assumed, distorted, or false. Their reality lies not in guaranteed truth, but in their capacity to organize experience and action.

Human reality is therefore not simply given in a fully formed state; it becomes available as information is articulated, stabilized, mediated, interpreted, and enacted.

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The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

AI Usage Statement

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