Impact of Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge on Corporate Value


  • Haifeng Li Shenzhen Hi-Tech Investment Group Co., Ltd, Chengdu, Sichuan
  • Haiyi He School of Finance, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, Sichuan
  • Yuanyuan Zhang School of Securities and Futures, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu, Sichuan



As an innovative financing behavior, equity pledge breaks the limit of traditional financing, and broadens the financing channels of companies and major shareholders. This paper comprehensively considers the impact of controlling shareholder equity pledge on corporate value from three research perspectives. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) When the equity pledge is not considered, the cash flow rights and voting rights of the company owned by the controlling shareholder are positively correlated with corporate value. That is, this presents incentive effect, but the existence of the separation of the two powers brings the second type of agency problem and reduces corporate value. (2) When considering the equity pledge, the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge may weaken the incentive effect and strengthen the encroachment effect which causing a reduction of corporate value. (3) Based on the accounting point of view, the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge is negatively correlated with the corporate performance, while the concentration of ownership dilutes this negative effect. (4) The balance of equity weakens the negative effect of the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge on corporate value, thereby reduces the negative impact of the equity pledge.


Separation of powers, Equity checks and balances, Equity concentration, Incentive effect, Encroachment effect


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