Management of air pollution by a system of transferable individual emission permits with overlapping generations.
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i1.449Abstract
The purpose of this article is to analyze the effectiveness of a pollution management system through individual permits that are distributed to young people with overlapping generations. From a general equilibrium model, the results show that such a system provides the conditions for optimal pollution management. But because of the non-cooperative behavior of the actors, this policy cannot institute intergenerational altruism. Incentives such as tax or subsidy are needed to get the receiving population to better choose between the physical good whose production satisfies their needs and the quality of the environment that depends on their option to sell the permits to firms or the future generation.
Keywords:
atmospheric pollution; overlapping generations; individual permitsReferences
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